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Executive Summary
This work is an attempt to explain wide variations in drug licensing deal value by using
regression modeling to describe and predict the relationship between oncology drug deal
characteristics and their licensing deal values. Although the reasons for large variances
in value between deals may not be immediately apparent, it was hypothesized that
objective independent variables, such as a molecule's phase, its target market size and the
size of the acquiring/licensor company could explain a significant portion of variation in
cancer drug values. This model, although not predictive when used independently, could
be used to supplement other discounted cash flow and market based techniques to help
assess the worth of incipient oncology therapies.
Using regression analysis to study drug licensing deals is not novel: a study was
published by Loeffler et al in 2002 that attempted to assess the impact of multiple
variables on deal value in a wide range of pharmaceutical indications. The independent
variables in Loeffler's work could explain less than 50% of differences in deal values. It
was expected that refining the model could lead to improved regression R squared
coefficient and, potentially, be a useful tool for managers. This current work is based on
the 2002 Loeffler paper, but differs significantly by:
* Focusing on just oncology licensing deals instead of deals covering many
indications,
* Incorporating a measure of the assets of the larger licensee company,
* Accounting for the licensing experience of the smaller licensor company,
* Factoring in inflation and the years the deals were signed; and
* Assessing the impact of primary indication market size.
The goal of the thesis was to advance the art of estimating the value of drug licensing
deals by assessing the impact of the aforementioned factors.
Methodology
This work evaluated 101 oncology partnerships signed between 1996 and 2005. Data
was gathered from ReCap.com and press releases related to the individual deals. Deal
value was defined as all potential licensing payments, as reported by ReCap'. Of the 101
molecules, 50 were indicated for a specific cancer type therefore it was possible to
associate potential market size and market growth rate data with these 50 deals. Market
size and growth rate were derived from Frost and Sullivan reports.
Regression analysis was conducted on the single independent variables and combinations
of the variables using R 2.2.1. Two primary regression models were done: one with all
101 deals and one with the sub-set of deals with a defined oncology indication. The
following hypotheses were made regarding independent variables:
' ReCap.com is used by many business development professionals; this source was used because the author
believed it was the most complete database available.
* Phase of molecule-it was expected that later stage molecules would be more
valuable,
* Assets of the licensee-it was expected that larger companies would pay more, all
other factors held equal,
* Identity of the licensee (pharmaceutical company vs. biotech, as defined by
ReCap)-it was hypothesized that pharmaceutical companies would pay more,
* Licensing experience of the licensor/smaller company-it was expected that
licensors with few previous deals would receive less compensation,
* State of the economy (as measured by previous years' GDP and NASDAQ
value)-it was hypothesized that licensing deals signed following periods of
relatively brisk economic growth would be more valuable; and
* Year of the deal-all deal values were inflation adjusted, however, it was still
hypothesized that partnerships later in the dataset would be more valuable due to
increased licensing competition.
Results
The following table shows descriptive statistics for the two data sets.
Data Set # of Deals Mean Std. Dev Median Range
All Cancer Deals 101 $102M $121M $56M $1-541M
Pre-Defined 50 $86M $107M $45M $1-515M
Indication
In the regression analysis of all 101 deals, the aforementioned variables were able to
explain 56.76% of variation in deal value (adjusted R-squared=52.98%). Among the 50
deals with a pre-defined indication, the independent variables explained 64.24% of
variation (adjusted R-squared=55.07%). The significant predictors of value were assets
of the licensee (p=5.3 e-14 when taken alone, p=9.18 e-10 in multivariate analysis)
experience of the licensor (p=.004347 in univariate analysis, .06652 in multivariate
analysis) molecule phase (p=.0428 taken alone, p=.00306 in multivariate analysis) and
year of the deal (p=4.03 e-5 in univariate analysis, p=.00513 in multivariate analysis)
were all significant positive predictors of value at the 5% level.
The following table shows the impact of independent variables among all analyzed deals.
Variable Beta P-Value
>2 Previous Licensor Deals $33.91M .06652
Prev. Years' Assets of Licensee $4.29M per $B in Assets 9.18 e-10*
Licensee is Pharmaceutical 
-$5.41M .79727
Molecule is Biologic $9.84M .60475
Molecule is in Stage 2 $4.98M .79624
Molecule is in Stage 3 $74.16M .00306*
License is Global $57.33M .14234
Year $10.28M .00513*
The following table shows the influence of independent variables among oncology deals
with a pre-defined cancer indication.
Variable Beta P-Value
>2 Previous Licensor Deals $44.92M .0483*
Prev. Years' Assets of Licensee $3.54M per $B in Assets 2.12e-06*
Licensee is Pharmaceutical 
-$28.26M .2385
Molecule is Biologic $23.34M .1469
Molecule is in Stage 2 -$2.24M .9392
Molecule is in Stage 3 $83.93M .0162*
License is Global $46.26M .2386
Year of Deal $9.52M .0343*
Mkt. Size of Indication $13.45M per $B in Mkt Size .0637
Proj. Growth Rate -$1.46M per % point in growth .4688
rate
*significant at the .05 level.
Conclusions
This work was significantly limited by the nature of available information: data from
ReCap included all up-front and potential milestone payments. Deal value, when tallied
this way may be representative of real value, but is inherently flawed since most of the
calculated deal value may never be paid. Inclusion of future payments may have also
inflated the value of early stage deals, since the study methodology treated them as if they
had already reached future milestones. This bias toward early stage molecules should
reduce the impact of molecule phase on the regression model.
Equally importantly, many subjective variables such as company strategy and molecule
safety and efficacy are key to licensing deal values; none of these were included in the
analysis. A study of key factors to licensing managers cited strategic concerns as
important inputs into deal value (Loeffler et al 2002).
The current data explains, at best, only 64.24% of changes in deal value. It is
hypothesized, based on inherent weaknesses in this work and conversations with
corporate licensing managers, that the remaining variation could be accounted for by
calculating real, probability-adjusted deal value, assessing existing drug competition in
specific therapeutic areas, and somehow quantifying strategic concerns that weigh on
licensing decisions. The mediocre R-squared in this work, especially given that the most
significant drivers of deal value will be unaffected by business development manager
actions, gives the model limited value as a decision making tool. Unfortunately,
managers cannot control their companies' past licensing experience or the FDA phase of
their drug candidate, although they may choose to target larger company partners to reap
more value.
Ideally, more follow-up study would be done, first focused on collecting accurate
information regarding the magnitude and timing of the components of total deal value.
These future payments could be probability adjusted and to present value. Also,
gathering information on existing competition in a given therapeutic area may make
market size and growth rate more significant variables, as most individuals interviewed in
association with this thesis suggested they would be. Once completed, an optimized
regression model that estimates 80-90% of deal value, combined with other valuation
techniques such as risk-adjusted NPV could be a valuable for pharmaceutical managers
who want to accurately price new licenses and for small company decision makers who
want to earn optimal value for their compounds. Additionally, such a model could lead
to understanding regarding the real drivers of drug candidate value, which could
influence decision-making earlier in the planning process for all emergent
pharmaceuticals.
Brief History of Licensing
The history of licensing is closely related to the history of patents, which can be traced
thousands of years. A version of intellectual property rights was practiced by the
Phoenicians; the first recognized patents were granted in the Republic of Venice in 1474.
The pharmaceutical industry was the first to make systematic use of licensing in Western
Europe and the United States: manufacturing licensing agreements allowed for the quick
dissemination of penicillin and bacitracin during World War II. In the 1970s,
pharmaceutical companies began buying the rights to screen potential compounds from
other industries. Chemical companies were the primary sources of compounds due to
their large libraries of new chemical entities (LESI 2001). Additionally, pharmaceutical
companies in-licensed products in territories where they had existing sales forces and out-
licensed drugs to other pharmaceutical companies to sell in other territories. In recent
decades, licensing has taken on more importance in pharmaceuticals and emerged as a
strategy in other industries.
Intellectual property author Robert Goldscheider (Goldscheider 2002) attributes the rise
in the use of licensing agreements to four factors:
1. Stronger patent protection,
2. Emergence of information technology (enabling the sharing, recording and analyzing
of information),
3. Internationalization of the market place; and
4. The transient nature of many workforces, which has lead to an increased focus on
knowledge management.
Increasing Importance of Licensing in Pharmaceuticals
The decline in pharmaceutical research productivity, as measured by the number of new
chemical entities approved per research dollar, has been well documented and cited in
recent years. The following graph shows steadily increasing pharmaceutical and NIH
research spending from 1993-2003 (FDA 2004). Over that ten-year period,
pharmaceutical spending on research more than doubled (PhRMA 2004).
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Meanwhile, the number of new approved drugs has been unimpressive. The following
graph shows the number of new biological and chemical entity applications submitted to
FDA over the same time period (PhRMA 2004).
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Licensing provides pharmaceutical companies with a lower risk investment alternative to
M&A, allowing licensees to limit and stage risk. Licensing is the most widely used form
of technology transfer in bio/pharmaceuticals today. Between 1998-2002,
pharmaceutical in licensing increased 60% (Demain 2004). The 20 largest
pharmaceutical companies formed nearly 1,500 partnerships with biotech between 1997
and 2002 (Lam 2004). The following chart shows leading pharmaceutical licensing firms
for the period March 2002-February 2003 (Demain 2004):
Even Merck, traditionally revered for its in-house R&D capabilities, has become an
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(Bernard 2004). In-licensed products accounted for 40% of Merck's new approved drugs
from 1995-2004 (Demain 2004).
According to research by Wood Mackenzie, licensed products will account for $100
billion by 2008 and will represent a third of the pharmaceutical industry's total projected
revenue, up from 17% in 2001 (Hall 2004). As demand for new compounds increases,
competition for viable drug candidates is getting tougher. The typical licensing deal has
five pharmaceutical suitors vying for it today, as compared to three in 1998 (Bernard
2004). According to a McKinsey study, up-front payments in therapeutic alliances
increased more than six-fold from 1988 to 2002, and average milestone payments soared,
from $6 million in 1988-1990 to $85 million in 2000-2002 (Myshko 2004).
The supply of promising new therapeutics is expected to shrink further. A 2004 study by
Boston Consulting Group estimated that the worldwide unlicensed clinical pipeline was
only 1,500 compounds, with licensing demand increasing an average of 10% each year.
Based on those assumptions, BCG estimated that the supply of compounds suitable for
licensing will be exhausted by 2008 (BCG Focus 2004). Conversely, perhaps factors
such as investments in basic science and genomics will yield a wellspring of compounds
that is not yet foreseeable, however, based on current information, there will be fewer
viable compounds in the near future.
Motivation for the Work
The author has been engaged as a strategic consultant to many early stage companies
developing therapeutics. For most of these incipient biotech companies, strategic
alliances with larger partners were a significant portion of planned financing and
provided inroads to potential exits via trade sale. Despite their importance to small
companies, the mechanics of strategic partnership valuations seem vague to many start-
up managers.
The author was especially interested in the strategic options for a long-time early stage
client developing a technology platform for cancer treatment. The company's technology
could be applied to a number of solid tumor types and potentially licensed multiple times
for different oncology indications or just once for all possible indications. The start-up's
managers sought help with the following issues:
* Should they attempt to pursue several exclusive licenses for individual
indications?
* If so, what is each indication worth?
* Would the sum of the value of the individual licenses exceed the value of one
potential license?
* What is the optimal time to license the molecule(s), given potential future value
increases, development cost and risks?
* Should they seek a worldwide partner or partnerships in individual regions?
* Should they partner with a large company with ample resources to commercialize
the technology or with a smaller company that will dedicate more attention to the
new product?
Multiple approaches, such as risk-adjusted NPV, benchmarking of similar deals and
option analysis, exist to value early stage pharmaceuticals, however these methods either
depend heavily on untested assumptions or vary widely in their deal value estimates.
Ideally, a manager could enter the specifics of his company's molecule into an equation
and receive an estimated value range.
This is clearly a naive vision of reality, since not only do individuals' perceptions of
value vary widely, each deal is impacted by human intervention: good or bad negotiators,
the immediate need for new products, the desire to preclude competitors from licensing
products, the need to divest an asset, etc. The following section outlines some methods
currently employed to value pre-market pharmaceutical products.
Risk-Adjusted NPV/Decision Tree Analysis
Risk-adjusted NPV is probably the most widely used integrative valuation model for
incipient pharmaceutical products. One begins by either estimating the total potential
market size based on salient patient populations or on existing drug sales in the targeted
category. An annual post-launch share is projected based on existing competition in a
market, the degree of need for the emerging product, the expected intensity of the
pharmaceutical sales effort and the technology's remaining patent life. One also
estimates expected direct project costs, including COGS, sales and marketing expenses
and clinical development costs. Subtracting expected costs from potential revenues
yields annual projected cash flows, which can be discounted back to present value.
At major product milestones, one can estimate the discounted cash flow value associated
with success or failure, then probability adjust those values based on their likelihood of
occurring. For instance, near the end of a product's development term, one can calculate
the expected discounted cash flow associated with a successful phase III trial and product
approval. Conversely, if the trial fails, the developing company will incur the discounted
costs associated with all development costs between the current decision point and the
phase III result. To determine value prior to phase III, The likelihood of success is
multiplied by the discounted cash flows associated with phase III success and added to
the product of the probability of phase III failure and discounted cash flows associated
with failure.
To project value prior to FDA phase II, this composite pre-phase III value is further
discounted back in time. The probability of phase II success is multiplied by the
discounted pre-phase III value and added to the product of the likelihood of phase II
failure and the discounted value of the costs associated with developing the product from
its current state to the completion of phase II. In this way, a biopharmaceutical product's
value can be estimated to its earliest stages.
Risk-adjusted NPV is an effective tool to approximate value in late stage products with
well-defined markets, however, uncertainty is compounded as projects are discounted
back to earlier stages. The predictive power of risk adjusted NPV is heavily dependent





* Probabilities of success at each major milestone; and
* Discount rate (especially for a licensor attempting to assess value to a licensee).
Market-Based Methods
The primary objective of market-based methods is to value assets by studying the prices
of comparable assets that have been traded between parties at arm's length in an active
market (Pitkethly 1997). The primary difficulty with market-based approaches with
regard to pharmaceuticals is identifying comparable molecules, given the multiple
nuances of molecule type, target, indication, phase and strategic significance.
Residual Value Analysis
Residual value analysis was devised by Parr et al as an alternative method to value
intellectual assets. If one has a market based valuation (either through a public stock
price or recent round of financing) of the IP holding company and the company's other
assets' value is easily quantified, the known asset value can be subtracted from total
enterprise value to estimate value of the asset in question (Parr et al 1988). Of course, in
the case of pre-market pharmaceutical products, a potential licensor's value may be
difficult to determine, as may its other assets, which are probably of equally
indeterminate value as the drug in question.
Real Options Analysis
The use of real options emerged from the realization that conventional valuation
techniques do not effectively account for manager flexibility and choices at multiple
decision points. "Real options" analysis attempts to extend financial call and put option
concepts to other ostensibly non-financial fields. A 1988 article by Mitchell and
Hamilton applied real options to drug valuations, equating the cost of a pharmaceutical
R&D project with the price of a call option on the future commercialization of the project
and the future investment needed to capitalize on the R&D program with the exercise
price of the option. The present value of the returns the company would receive from the
investment could be viewed as the value of the share subject to the call option (Mitchell
and Hamilton 1988).
In the context of biopharmaceutical licensing agreements, the licensee could be viewed as
effectively purchasing a call option on the technology's potential. An investment in a
new drug project gives one the option to continue or increase investment if things go well
and to discontinue or decrease investment if things do not go well, however unlike
standard financial options, the underlying asset cannot be easily traded, so real options
analysis may not be applicable.
Overall, valuation of licensed drug candidates remains more art than science. Objective
valuation methods exist but require substantial subjective inputs to generate estimates of
value. Risk-adjusted NPV is the most widely used quantitative method and is easily
understood by a range of stakeholders. Risk-adjusted NPV informed and verified by
market-based approaches is probably the most accurate valuation method available today.
In addition to quantitative factors, the involvement of human business development
managers necessitates consideration of qualitative concerns. Few studies have attempted
to assess what licensing managers value most. The following is a discussion of one such
study upon which this work is partially based.
What Matters to Licensing Managers?
In their 2002 work, Loeffler et al surveyed licensing managers to determine the factors
they deemed most important to the value of a biopharmaceutical deal. The following
table, from their work, shows the managers' responses (Loeffler et al 2002):
Value driver Percentage of respondents
mentioning it as important
Market. including market size for the liceIs4ng agreement. 88%
market potential. or patient aopulat;on
Stage phase or stage in the development of tne prod,,:'-t 69%
Strategy. including issues of "fit" of Ihie prod-r.t ir" the co.nparnys 44%
pipeline and franchises. impact on the current t'us ncss. and syncrg es
Competition ---compolitivo markets. compet:ion from ot'her .arlners 38%
for the product. and compctitive protucts
Reputation of the licensee or Itcensor. Ircuc-ng inventor ard 31%
management talent
Inveshtment financial neoes to develop th[e pro:ct 25%
Intellectual property--gaining key patents or trade secrets 25%
Novelty innovative merit of the prcduct (re-.o'wu:ionarý o evoliuionary) 19%
Control of the (lvelopment and commerciali;-aion cf a procuct 6%
Comparable deal valuations for 'imilar pro.dducts;technoogtes 6%
Roimlbursonont---ability or wilVtirgness c'C ckStorerS :payers or paiienls) 6%
to pay for the product
The emerging drug's addressable market was cited as important by the most managers,
with the stage of the molecule (affecting the degree of risk and the time to
commercialization) also key to most business development professionals. In terms of
objective magnitude, both market size and molecule phase are relatively easy to assess,
however, synergy with the licensee's business goals, degree of competition and
reputation of the licensee/licensor are more difficult to incorporate into a regression
model. Surprisingly, comparable deal values, derived from aforementioned market-based
approaches, were not cited as important.
Based on large unexplained variation in their regression model, Loeffler et al
hypothesized that additional factors play a significant role in licensing deal values. These
factors included:
* A manager's "quality", assumedly applicable to either the licensor or licensee.
Effective managers could reap more value or pay less for new drugs, as
appropriate,
* The pharmaceutical industry's vulnerability and willingness to pay premiums for
products that could help fill their pipelines; and
The pharmaceutical industry's willingness to pay for true innovation, not
necessarily to develop these products but to prevent the competition from doing
so (Loeffler et al 2002).
These additional factors almost certainly play a role, however, much of the unaccounted
for variation could have been contributed by qualitative factors that were cited as
important by the licensing managers but not factored into Loeffler et al's regression
model, including licensor/licensee strategy, competition, reputation, investment
requirements, quality of the intellectual property, control over development, comparable
deal values and reimbursement issues. "Licensor/licensee strategy" is a broad and
complex variable, comprising many qualitative objectives. The following is a list of
major strategic licensing objectives, as described by Robert A. Myers (Myers 2001):
* Additional revenue from existing assets,
* Avoid need to invest capital in capacity,
* Avoid need to add personnel,
* Build new business with partner's know-how,
* Obtain exclusive access from supplier,
* Obtain additional talent from partner,
* Co-opt potential competition,
* Profitably divest unpromising business,
* Acquire complementary skills, know-how, channels, etc. solve patent problem; and
* Get to market faster and better
Clearly "strategic objectives" comprise a vast and non-quantifiable realm but are an
essential aspect of deal value. In modern bio-pharmaceutical licensing "filling the
pipeline" has become the dominant motivation. The need to have promising candidates
at all stages and maintain robust growth encompasses many of the objectives cited by
Myers. Unfortunately, since it is difficult to objectively assess a company's need for a
product at a specific stage or in a specific therapeutic area, this work does not accurately
account for company strategy, which is a major limitation.
Methodologv
Identification and Exclusion of Oncology Deals
Licensing deals from 1996-2005 were culled from the ReCap (www.recap.com) database.
An attempt was made to concentrate only on exclusive oncology partnerships for
proprietary molecules between smaller biotech companies licensors and larger biotech or
pharmaceutical company licensees. Deals with the following characteristics were
excluded from analysis.
* Molecules with additional stated non-cancer indications,
* Co-marketing deals between two large companies,
* Deals for supportive care indications such as hematopoesis or pain,
* Deals in which a smaller company bought a large company's oncology asset,
* Mergers and acquisitions,
* Joint ventures,
* Deals in which a university was the licensor; and
* Partnerships involving generic compounds.
Additionally, the 2001 deal between ImClone and Bristol Myers for Erbitux was
excluded. This partnership was also excluded from Loeffler et al's 2002 study due to its
extraordinary size (Loeffler et al 2002).
It was believed that the market size of the molecule's target indication (e.g. lung, breast,
or prostate cancer) and projected growth rate of the targeted market would be significant
predictors of value. For approximately half (51) of the 101 analyzed deals, the primary
oncologic indication was not available. This is because the majority of these molecules
were in early stages of testing, prior to initiating human trials. As a result, regression
analysis was performed using two data sets:
1) All 101 deals, including a mix of molecules with stated cancer targets and
molecules in development for unknown cancer types; and
2) A sub-set of 50 deals for which a primary indication was named.
Definition of Deal "Value" and Associated Limitations
Total deal value, as published by ReCap, was used as the dependent variable for analysis.
"Deal value" includes upfront cash payments, cash consideration for equity and all
potential future milestone payments but excludes royalties. Total deal value was then
inflation adjusted2 and expressed in 2005 dollars. This measure is an admittedly
inaccurate measure of deal value for many reasons.
o The inclusion of payments for equity in the smaller company is suspect
because the licensee is receiving some additional consideration
(assumedly the licensor's stock has some value, although most of the
licensors in the database were private at the time of the deals) exclusive of
2 Using GDP
the molecule being licensed. Deals for which equity payments were a
primary component will, therefore, be overvalued in this analysis.
o The inclusion of all potential milestone payments diminishes the
importance of FDA phase in the analysis. If milestone payments are
included and treated as cash equivalents, early stage molecules may be
valued as if they are already fully developed; this would lead to their
values being artificially high and later stage molecules' values being
artificially low since they would have relatively few milestone payments
left (however, that value of milestone payments would be inherently
considered due to achievement of past clinical milestones). One could
attempt to adjust for this in the following manner:
1) Identify the timing of milestone payments in each deal,
2) Assess the probability of passing each FDA phase (using data from
Tufts or other sources) and
3) Probability adjust the milestone payments based on their associated
phase and average likelihood of reaching that phase, estimate the point
in the future that those payments could be made then discount them
back to present value.
Given the limited data available from ReCap3 and the difficulty of
obtaining this information from independent sources for 101 deals, this
analysis was not performed.
o The exclusion of royalties from deal value is another major shortcoming of
the study methodology. Less than 10% of deals analyzed by ReCap
contained royalty information, therefore royalties were not integrated into
the regression model. Royalty rates were not published with most deals
and those that were listed varied widely, from 3% to as high as 50%. The
focus on traditional small biotech-large biotech and small biotech-
pharmaceutical company deals was an attempt to adjust for the omission
of royalties, eliminating assumedly higher royalty joint ventures and co-
marketing deals. Despite this, the study is certainly biased against
molecules that were licensed for a high royalty, since that value is not
captured.
Ignoring royalties may further diminish the impact of FDA phase, since later stage
licensed products are typically expected to garner higher royalties. Guidelines published
by the patent specialty firm Novelint estimate that a drug in the pre-clinical phase may
receive 2-3% royalties in a licensing deal, a product licensed during in FDA human trials
may receive 3-4% on future sales and an approved drug may net the licensor 5-7%
3 ReCap lists only a total value for most deals; press releases are often attached, but these rarely specify the
timing and magnitude of milestone payments. Most press releases do not state that "terms of the
partnership were not disclosed".
royalties (Meyer 2001). A study of biotech royalty rates completed in 2001 reported the
following average royalty rates (Medius Associates 2001):
First, it is remarkable that two sources could differ so much in their royalty rate
estimates. More significant to this work, royalty rates are expected to vary widely
according to FDA phase. If royalties are a significant portion of total deal value, the
difference between a 0-5% royalty and a 10-20% rate is substantial; because royalty rates
were omitted in this work, later stage deals should be undervalued.
Definitions of Independent Variables and Rationale for Inclusion
This work is based in large part on the analysis conducted by Loeffler et al in 2002; an
attempt was made to use the variables included in the 2002 study as a baseline then add
and subtract variables as was deemed appropriate. The following table shows variables
that were published4 in the 2002 work as compared to variables considered herein5
Variable Included in 2002? Included in this Work?
Licensor's previous partnership No Yes
experience
Licensee's assets No Yes
Licensee is biotech or Yes Yes
pharmaceutical
Drug is small molecule or Yes Yes
biologic
Phase of candidate Yes Yes
Global or U.S. only rights Yes Yes
Primary indication market size No Yes
Primary indication growth rate No Yes
Year of deal No Yes
Novelty of molecule Yes No
Marketing vs. non-marketing Yes No
license
Overall, it was thought that including additional variables could increase predictive
power. "Novelty of molecule" was assessed subjectively in the 2002 study using a 1-5
scale: revolutionary products were considered most novel, receiving high scores and
evolutionary products that represented incremental improvements to an existing product
were rated least novel and received lower scores. More revolutionary products were
associated with higher deal values in the 2002 study, especially in cancer deals, in which
drugs rated "5" for novelty reaped 107% more value than drugs rated "1" (Loeffler et al
4 Additional variables were studied but their impact was not published in the Nature Biotech article.
5 The variables "cytotoxic vs. targeted", "prior year GDP" and "prior year NASDAQ value" were captured
for this work but were not extensively analyzed.






2002). Novelty was not included in this study due to the difficulty associated with
assigning subjective values based on very limited information.
"Marketing vs. non-marketing", captured in the 2002 work, referred to whether the
licensee received rights to market the compound. This variable was not explicitly
considered in this work but the exclusion of other non-traditional deals was an attempt to
adjust for the nature of the partnership relationship. As a result, nearly all of the analyzed
deals were "marketing".
The immediately following sections describe the rationale for inclusion of variables not
addressed in the 2002 Loeffler work and general methods associated with all analyzed
variables.
Previous Deal-making Experience by Licensor
The 2002 study, "Biotech-Pharmaceutical Alliances as a Signal of Asset and Firm
Quality" by Nicholson, Danzon and McCullough had a significant impact on this work.
Nicholson et al studied the impact of previous pharmaceutical alliances on an early stage
biotech company's valuation, demonstrating that biotechs that have signed previous deals
receive higher valuations from venture capitalists and public equity markets.
Additionally, the authors found that biotech companies that have entered into previous
partnerships receive higher average deal values in subsequent partnerships (Nicholson et
al 2002).
Nicholson et al attributed the discount that early stage biotech companies receive to
pharmaceutical company search costs: significant resources are expended to identify and
evaluate new biotech companies. In their analysis the authors found that first time
licensors received a 60% discount; the average discount for second-time licensors was
30% (Nicholson et al 2002). Based on these results, it was hypothesized that the
licensor's partnership experience would have an impact on the regression model.
In this work, previous licensing experience was assessed by evaluating the licensor's
previously published ReCap deals. Previous deals with universities and deals that
conferred access to drug discovery technology were not counted as previous experience.
For the regression model, companies were divided into two classes: 0-2 previous deals
and 3+ previous deals.
Licensee Assets
In the 2002 Loeffler evaluation of licensing deal values, the identity (pharmaceutical or
biotech) of the licensee was a significant factor in deal valuation, probably because it
served as a proxy for company size. In this work it was hypothesized that, due to the
maturation of some active licensing large biotech companies, the licensee's identity
would not be nearly as significant. As a result, licensee assets at the end of the year prior
to the analyzed deal was captured and included in regression analysis. Licensee assets
were evaluated using historic data from Yahoo! Finance.
Licensee Identity
Larger licensee companies were coded as "biotech" or "pharmaceutical" based solely on
ReCap's classification. All of the small licensor companies were biotechs.
Molecule Type
Molecule type, either biologic or small molecule was coded according to ReCap's
classifications: all vaccines were considered "biologics" for regression purposes,
however, independent descriptive statistical analysis was conducted for vaccine products
to identify salient trends.
Molecule Phase
Drug phases were initially coded in six classes: discovery phase, pre-clinical phase, FDA
Phase I, Phase II, Phase III and Market/Phase IV according to ReCap's disclosure of each
molecule's phase at the time the analyzed deal was signed. The following table shows





























One would expect that value would increase steadily as compounds meet FDA
milestones. The standard deviations indicate suggest that other factors (such as
inaccurate measurement of deal value or the existence of a few large outlying deals are at
play. Ostensibly, these findings are surprising, however these results echo those of
Nicholson et al and Loeffler et al. The following table is from Nicholson's 2002 study
(Nicholson et al 2002).
IPrnclinical Phase I Phase 2 Phase 3
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In an effort to account for molecule phase in the regression model, the six
phases were re-organized into three arbitrary "stages":
* Discovery & Pre-clinical studies = Stage I
* FDA Phase I & Phase II = Stage II
* FDA Phase III & Marketed products = Stage III
This classification system yielded the following mean deal values.
"Stae" FDA Phases I # of Deals I Mean Value
captured FDA
I Discovery & pre- 10 $66.6M
clinical
II Phases I & II 22 $70.1M
III Phase III & Market 18 $123.5M
Global or U.S.-only Rights
Deals were coded according to ReCap's statement of the scope of rights granted. Nearly
all of the analyzed partnerships granted global rights.
Market Size & Project Growth Rate
Most discounted cash flow analysis of drug values begins with the addressable market
size of the drug's primary indication. Similarly, the future growth potential of a drug
market is considered an important future value determinant. It was hypothesized that
market size and projected growth rate would, therefore, be significant predictors of value.
Additionally, Loeffler's 2002 work found that market size was key factor for the largest
percentage of licensing managers, cited by 88% of surveyed managers (Loeffler et al
2002).
Ideally, market size and growth rate data for all indications would be gathered from the
same source and year. Since the analyzed data set spans ten years, determining the
appropriate year for which to capture market size is problematic. One could argue that a
time point in the middle of the data set would be ideal. 2001 was chosen because a 2001
Frost and Sullivan report that analyzed most cancer markets was available for free to the
author. The following are market sizes and projected growth rates that were employed in
this work.
Cancer Indication Number of Deals 2001 Worldwide Market 2001-2011 Projected
Size (SM) (Frost & Sullivan CAGR (Frost & Sullivan
2001) 2001)
Non-small-cell Lung 3 1,360 17.9%
Prostate 8 2,498 0.8%
Breast 7 3,280 13.5%
Colon 3 660 12.9%
Ovarian 4 637 7.4%
Non-Hodgkins 9 229 14.4%
Lymphomas
Leukemias 7 99 1.2%
Pancreatic 3 227 3.1%
Melanoma 4 184 8.1%
Bladder 2 237 6.5%
Brain 1 37 9.1%
Additionally, there were two deals for bile duct cancer and head and neck cancer. Due to
the low prevalence of these cancers, Frost and Sullivan did not estimate market size or
project 10-year growth rates. For bile duct cancer, market size was estimated based on a
percentage of the published colon cancer market. Annual U.S. incidence of bile duct
cancer is 4500 new cases, compared to 148,000 new colon cancer cases (American
Cancer Society)6. The market for bile duct cancer was, therefore, derived by multiplying
this incidence ratio (.03) by Frost and Sullivan's estimated $660M market for colon
cancer. The result was a $20M market size for bile duct cancer. Frost and Sullivan's
projected market growth rate for colon cancer was also applied to the one deal involving
a treatment specified for bile duct cancer.
The market for head and neck cancer was estimated based on the ratio of its U.S.
incidence to the U.S. incidence of brain cancer. There are approximately 40,000 new
cases of head and neck cancer diagnosed in the U.S. each year, compared to 17,000 new
brain cancer cases (American Cancer Society). The market for head neck cancer was,
therefore, entered as $87M; the growth rate employed was 9.1%, the same as for
therapies to treat brain cancer.
These market sizing methods are admittedly inexact, however, the objective was not to
distinguish between a $30M market and a $37M market, but to distinguish between a
$30M market and a $2B market.
Primary indication(s) were defined by ReCap or by press releases linked to the analyzed
deals. The total deals by indication listed above exceeds 50, the size of the indication-
specified data set. This discrepancy is due to three incipient drugs that were in trials for
multiple indications. In these cases, market sizes for the multiple indications were
summed and growth rates were averaged.
Year of Deal
Although all deal values were inflation indexed, it was hypothesized that more recent
deals would still earn higher values, due to the aforementioned increase in licensing
competition. The typical licensing deal has five pharmaceutical suitors vying for it today,
as compared to three in 1998 (Bernard 2004). According to a McKinsey and Company
study, up-front payments in therapeutic alliances increased more than six-fold from 1988
to 2002, and average milestone payments soared, from $6 million in 1988-1990 to $85
million in 2000-2002 (Myshko 2004).
The following graph shows average inflation-adjusted deal value by year, demonstrating
a clear increase:
6 These are U.S. estimates; although the ratio of bile duct cancer to colon cancer may be significantly
different worldwide, the purpose of this exercise was to attribute a subjectively appropriately small market
size to bile duct cancer, so this U.S./worldwide discrepancy is probably not material.
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The year of the deal was, therefore, included in the regression model.
Cytotoxic vs. Targeted
"Cytotoxic" molecules were defined as agents that generally interfere with DNA
replication or the cell cycle, such as most chemotherapies currently in use. "Targeted"
molecules were associated with a named receptor target or pathway. It was not
hypothesized which molecule class would earn higher deal values: the cytotoxic drugs
would likely address a wider range of cancers, while the targeted therapies would likely
possess a milder toxicology profile.
Previous Year U.S. GDP
It was expected that the overall state of the U.S. economy would have a significant
impact on deal value. Since partnerships typically take several months to develop and
consummate, it was expected that real GDP growth in the year prior to deal signing
would be an appropriate, although imperfect measure of the economic climate while the
parties were considering the transaction. Annual real GDP growth was obtained from the
federal Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
Previous Year NASDAQ Closing Value
It was expected that stock market value would be positively correlated with value.
Higher stock prices could give larger licensees the ability to pay more for deals: although
licensing deals are nearly always consummated in exchange for cash, increases in a
firm's stock price may presage an overall expansion. Higher valuations for smaller
companies could make them less desperate for licensee cash. Again, because deals often
take many months to complete, the previous year's value was seen as most appropriate.
Ideally, a pharmaceutical or biotech stock index would have been used, however these
indices did not exist during the earlier years of the data set.
Regression Methods
Regression analysis was done using R 2.2.1. Two separate multivariate regressions were
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primary oncology indication. Then, each individual variable was removed to determine
the impact on each model. Finally, each variable was examined in univariate regression
analysis to determine its independent impact on deal value.
Results
Comparison of Two Data Sets
Regression analysis was conducted using all 101 oncology deals and also using a 51 deal
subset of deals for which the primary cancer target was already defined. Of the 101
deals, the mean inflation adjusted deal value was $102M, with a standard deviation of
$121M. The median deal size was $56M, with deal values ranging from $1-$541M.
Among the 51 deals with a pre-defined primary indication, the mean inflation-adjusted
value was $86M, with a standard deviation of $107M. The median value of this dataset
was $45M, with a total range of $1-$515.
Data Set # of Deals Mean Std. Dev Median Range
All Cancer Deals 101 $102M $121M $56M $1-541M
Pre-Defined 50 $86M $107M $45M $1-515M
Indication
The deals with pre-defined indications were, on average, much later stage than the overall
data set. This is because all molecules in FDA Phase II or later must disclose and target a
primary indication for efficacy trials. The other captured independent variables were
similar among the two data sets. The following table shows mean values of key variables
for the two data sets.
Independent Variable All Cancer Deals Pre-Defined Indication
% of Licensors w/ <3 deals 39.6% 36.0%
Mean Assets of Licensee $11,638M $10,172M
% of Biotech-Pharma Deals 60.4% 56%
% Small Molecule 37.6% 44.0%
% Discovery Stage 17.8% 8.0%
% Pre-Clinical 25.7% 12.0%
% Phase I 15.8% 12.0%
% Phase II 21.8% 32.0%
% Phase III 16.8% 28.0%
% Market 4.0% 8%
% U.S. Only 5.9% 10.0%
% Targeted vs. Cytotoxic 72.3% 72.0%
Regression Results Summary
In the overall data set of 101 deals, the variables "previous deals by licensor", "assets of
licensee", "biotech/pharma licensee", "small molecule/biologic", "stage 2", "stage 3"
"U.S./global" and "year of deal were able to account for 56.75% of variation in deal
value. Adjusted R-squared was 52.98%, with a p-value of 6.391e-14. The Y intercept
(baseline deal value) was -$20.06M, a result of the high amount of variability in the
model. The following table shows the impact of selected independent variables.
Variable Beta Std. Error P-Value
>2 Previous Licensor Deals $33.91M $18.26M .06652
Prev. Years' Assets of Licensee $4.291M per $B in Assets $.6288M per 9.18 e-10*
$B in Assets
Licensee is Pharmaceutical 
-$5.41M $21.OM .79727
Molecule is Biologic $9.84M $18.95M .60475
Molecule is in Stage 2 $4.98M $19.22M .79624
Molecule is in Stage 3 $74.16M $24.37M .00306*
License is Global $57.33M $38.74M .14234
Year $10.28M $3.58M .00513
*Statistically significant at the .05 level
Overall, the the assets of the larger licensee, the stage of the molecule and the year of the
deal were significant predictors of deal value at the 5% level. The licensor's previous
licensing experience was nearly statistically significant.
Within the sub-set of 50 deals that had a pre-defined cancer indication, the variables
"previous deals by licensor", "assets of licensee", "biotech/pharma licensee", "small
molecule/biologic", "stage 2", "stage 3", "U.S./global", "year", "market size" and
"market growth rate" accounted for 64.24% of variability in deal value (adjusted R-
squared of 55.07%, p-value=9.612e-06). The Y intercept (baseline deal value) was -
$19.1M. The following table shows the impact of selected independent variables on deal
value among molecules with a pre-defined indication.
Variable Beta Std. Error P-Value
>2 Previous Licensor Deals $44.92M $22.03M .0483*
Prev. Years' Assets of Licensee $3.54M per $B in Assets $.64M per $B 2.12e-06*
in Assets
Licensee is Pharmaceutical -$28.26M $23.61M .2385
Molecule is Biologic $23.34M $23.61M .1469
Molecule is in Stage 2 -$2.24M $29.19M .9392
Molecule is in Stage 3 $83.93M $33.38M .0162*
License is Global $46.26M $38.65M .2386
Year of Deal $9.52M $4.34M .0343*
Mkt. Size of Indication $13.45M per $B in Mkt Size $7.05M per $B .0637
in Mkt Size
Proj. Growth Rate -$1.46M per % point in growth $2.0M per % .4688
rate point in
growth rate
*Statistically significant at the .05 level
In this smaller data set, licensee experience, licensor assets, being identified as a stage 3
molecule and the year the deal was signed were significant predictors of value.
Impact of Individual Independent Variables
Licensor Previous Deals
The partnering history of the licensor company was a significant predicator of deal value.
This phenomen was presaged by Nicholson's and Danzon, who attributed the discount
that young biotech companies receive to search costs incurred by their larger partners.
Nicholson's and Danzon found that the average discount for first time licensors is 60%,
shrinking to 30% upon the company's second deal and disappearing upon its third
partnership (Nicholson et al 2002).
Among the 101 oncology drug deals, 17 of the licensor companies had not signed a
previous exclusive therapeutic deal, 14 had signed one previous deal and 9 had signed 2
deals prior to the analyzed partnership. The following table shows mean deal value based
on the number of previous deals the smaller licensor companies had signed.
Category # of Companies Mean Value
0 Prev. Deals 17 $32.2M
1 Prevy Deal 14 $78.6M
2 Prev. Deals 9 $50.3M
0-2 40 $53.2M
All Other Deals 61 $134.5
The oncology deals studied did not precisely follow Nicholson and Danzon's pattern,
however, the mean value of deals signed by licensors who had 0-2 previous partnerships
was significantly different from the mean value of deals made by more experienced
licensors (p=l1.347e-14).
Licensing experience of the smaller company had an impact, although not technically
statistically significant, on the overall deal value regression model. The overall model
predicts that companies that had signed 3 or more previous deals receive $33.91M more
than companies that have signed 2 or fewer deals (p=.06652). Among deals for
compounds with a pre-defined cancer indication, having a licensor that had signed more
than two previous deals increased value $44.92M; this variable was statistically
significant (p=.0483).
Taken alone, experience of the licensor company is sufficient to explain 10.8% of the
variation in deal value in either aforementioned model (p=.004347 and p=.0241
respectively in the two regression models). When the variable is removed, the other
variables still explain 55.13% of deal value variability in the overall model and 60.43%
of value changes in deals for compounds with a pre-defined cancer indication.
Licensee Assets
It was thought that the maturation of large biotech companies such as Genentech and
Amgen might blunt the previously marked difference between the values of deals in
which the licensee is a biotech and the value of deals in which the larger partner is
classified as a pharmaceutical company. Although assets reported in the prior year is
admittedly an imperfect proxy for size, this variable explained a substantial portion of
variation in licensing deal value. Independent of other factors, licensee assets and deal
value were 66% correlated.
In the overall regression model, a $1 billion change in licensee assets caused a $4.29M
change in deal value. In the sub-set of 50 deals, each $1B in assets increased deal value
$3.54M. Taken alone, licensee assets explains 43.7% of variation in deal value in the
large data set (p=5. 3 e-14) and 37.6% of variation in the 51 deals for molecules with pre-
defined indications (p=2.24 e-6).
Removing licensee assets had a pronounced impact on overall predictive power, reducing
the R-squared coefficient to .2074. Among deals for molecules with a pre-defined cancer
indication, R-squared was reduced to .2109.
Identity of the Licensee Company: Biotech vs. Pharmaceutical
In the 2002 analysis conducted by Loeffler et al, licensing deal values were much higher
when the licensee company was classified as a pharmaceutical company: pharmaceutical
companies paid 122.8% more than their biotech counterparts (Loeffler et al 2002). The
oncology deal data set ostensibly yielded a similar result: the mean value biotech
licensees paid was $57M, while pharmaceutical companies paid an average of $132M.
Descriptive statistics are shown in the following table.
Licensee Type # of Deals Mean Deal Value Std. Dev.
Biotech 40 $57M $67M
Pharmaceutical 61 $132M $139M
The deal values of the two groups are significantly different (p=9.92e-58). The premium
paid by pharmaceutical companies was echoed in single variable regression analysis: in
the total data set, beta for pharma vs. biotech was $75M (y intercept=$57M, p value of
beta=.00204). In the sub-set of deals with a defined indication, beta=$38.44 (y
intercept=$65.5M, p value for beta=.21757). R squared coefficients for the regression
models were .09209 and .0315 respectively.
However, when biotech/pharma was considered with the other independent variables,
being a pharmaceutical company may have caused a partner to pay less for otherwise
equivalent molecules. Beta for pharmaceutical/biotech in the overall regression model
was -$5.41M (p=.79721). Within deals with a named primary indication, being a
pharmaceutical company may be a more pronounced negative predictor of value: beta=-
$28.26M (p=.2385).
The relationships were not statistically significant, however, the contradiction in data
may be explained by the effect of licensee assets on the predictive power of licensee
identity. When licensee assets is removed from the regression models, being a
pharmaceutical licensee is again a positive predictor of deal value, significantly so in the
case of the overall model. Betas for the two models were $69.07M (p=.00216) and
$24.25M (p=.40160) respectively.
Removing licensee company identification had a small impact in the primary model,
reducing R-squared to .5671 (from .5675). With the licensee's identity is removed,
licensee assets are less of a positive influence on value: a $1B change in assets produces a
$4.2M change in value, compared to a slightly different $4.3M if licensee identity is
included. In the deals for molecules with a pre-defined oncology indication, removing
licensee identification reduces R-squared modestly, to .6293 (from .6424). Again, the
magnitude of the change in value caused by assets is mildly reduced (from $3.2M per $B
to $3.5M per $B). In either deal model, licensee assets is a statistically significant
predictor of value if the licensee company identities are removed.
A further interpretation of the relationship between licensee company type, company size
(as measured by assets) and deal value could be that, on the whole, pharmaceutical
companies pay more, but they are, in general, larger as measured by assets. Very large
biotech companies may actually pay more than their pharmaceutical company peers.
Impact of Small Molecule or Biologic
For purposes of the regression analysis, cancer vaccines were classified as biologics. No
significant difference was found in mean deal value between the small molecule, biologic
and vaccine groups or between the small molecule and biologic groups. The following
table shows descriptive statistics for the three groups.
MoleculeType # of Deals 7  Mean Deal Value Std. Dev
Small Molecule 38 $116.3M $153.OM
SBiologic 48 $87.8M $89.9M
Vaccine 13 $83.5M $95.2M
In the primary regression model, biologics may have had slightly higher values
(Beta=$9.8M, p=.60475). Among deals for molecules with a pre-defined cancer
indication, biologics may have been worth $32.34M (p=.1469) more than small
molecules. Small molecule vs. biologic had nearly no predictive power when considered
independently (R-squared=.01004, .02286 in the sub-set regression).
In the overall model, removing the variable has a negligible impact on the model,
decreasing multiple R-squared to 56.62% (from 56.75%). Among deals for molecules
with a pre-defined cancer indication, R-squared decreased to 62.23% (from 64.24%).
One could formulate multiple conflicting hypotheses regarding the relative values of
biologics and small molecules. Some possible influences on value include:
* The difficulties associated with formulating and manufacturing biologics, which
would decrease value relative to small molecules,
* The relatively mild safety profile of biologics, which could increase their value;
and
* The relative freedom from post-patent expiration generic competition that
biologics enjoy; this factor would also increase their value relative to small
molecules
The 2002 study led by Loeffler found that small molecules, on average had 50.6% higher
deal values, however, among cancer deals, small molecules were worth less than
biologics, reducing value 7.3% (Loeffler 2002).
Overall, the compound's molecular identity had little or no impact on value in this work.
7 Total N=99, does not include two deals that were classified as both "small molecule" and "biologic"
Stage of Molecule
Intuitively, phase of a drug candidate should be an important, perhaps the most important
predictor of value, all other factors held constant. The following graph presents results of
a 2002 study of Canadian biotechnology company values; the overall value trend and










In this current work, the effects of molecule phase on deal value were underwhelming,
echoing the results of Loeffler et al. Loeffler's 2002 study found that, on average, Phase
IV deals were worth 21.5% more than discovery or pre-clinical stage deals, only 20.7%
more in cancer. The previous work by Nicholson et al. had similar findings. The
following table was presented in their 2002 paper, based on data gathered from the
Windhover database (Nicholson et al 2002).
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In an attempt to effectively factor FDA phase into the model, the variable, which was
initially captured in five different categories, was divided into three stages. With this
alteration, molecule stage does have some influence over deal value. The following beta
values for the complete data set are expressed in terms of deviation from "stage 1" deals.
"Stage" FDA Phases # of Deals Mean Value Beta P Value
II Phases I & II 38 $99.0M $6.3M .75220
III Phase III & Market 21 $146.0M $71.9M .00549






Late stage (FDA phase m and approved) deals are clearly more valuable than deals for
molecules in earlier phases. Modeled independently, stage predicts only 4.12% of deal
variation (p=.0428). Removing stage from the model reduces R-squared to 48.36%.
Phase has a more significant impact on the values of deals with a defined primary
indication; "stage IIr' deals were worth $91.3M more than "stage I" deals. The
following table shows values according to stage for the indication-defined deals.
"Stage" FDA Phases # of Deals Mean Value Beta P Value
I Discovery & pre- 10 $66.6M -
clinical
II Phases I & II 22 $70.1M $9.0M .7649
III Phase III & Market 18 $123.5M $91.3M .0122
Independently, stage accounts for 6.088% of deal variation (p=.02164); removing stage
reduces R-squared to 51.86% (compared to 56.75%) in the primary regression model and
reduces R-squared to 53.59% (compared to 64.24%).
The impact of molecule phase may be partially nullified by the nature of the dependent
variable being measured: "deal value" includes all future projected milestone payments.
A molecule in FDA phase III will have a higher value because it is later stage, but will
have very few milestone payments remaining, whereas an earlier stage but otherwise
identical deal will have less current value and significant potential future milestone
payments remaining that would be factored into "deal value" as measured.
Global vs. U.S.-only Rights
Deals in which rights were granted only to Europe, Asia or Japan were excluded; analysis
was limited to deals for U.S.-only rights and deals for worldwide rights. One could have
applied a factor to account for the size of the market accessed, however, there were too
few of these deals to merit such analysis. Including deals for Europe, Asia or Japan only
rights probably Of the 101 analyzed deals, 95 granted global rights and only 6 provided
U.S.-only rights. The small sample size of the US-only group limited the variable's
statistical power. The mean deal value for U.S.-only agreements was $71.75M; the mean
value for global deals was $104.22M.
In the primary regression model, the global deals may have been worth $57.33M more
than the 6 U.S. only partnerships (p=.14234). Analyzed alone, geographic rights
accounted for less than 1% of deal variability. Removing the global/U.S. variable
reduced multiple R-squared to 55.72% (from 56.75%). In the subset of deals with a
defined primary indication, broader license scope may have increased deal value by
$46.75M (p=.2386). Alone, it explained less than 1% of deal value variation. Without
deal scope, R-squared is reduced slightly to 62.93% (from 64.24%).
In the 2002 Loeffler paper, scope of the rights granted was a significant predictor of
value: global deals were worth 37.6% more in all indications and 85.8% more in cancer-
specific deals.
Market Size & Growth Rate
Market size was estimated only for the 50 deals for which primary oncology indication
was available. The variable was less correlated with value than expected, only 9.6%.
Within the regression model, each $B in market size of the targeted indication caused a
$13.45M change in deal value (p=.0637). Individually, market size predicts only .9193%
of deal value. Removing market size reduces R-squared to 60.9% (from 64.24%).
Initial analysis indicates that growth rate of the primary indication is also slightly
positively associated with deal value, with a correlation coefficient of 12%. Taken alone,
growth rate has a positive effect on deal value, but explains only 1.5% of deal value
variation.
As a component in the multiple regression, market growth rate may actually be
negatively associated with value: each % increase causes a $1.42M decrease in deal value
(p=.4688). When market size and growth rate are isolated as independent variables,
growth rate is again positively associated with value, although the two variables together
only explain 2.3% of changes in deal value.
The variable is somehow linked to licensee company assets: when assets are removed
from the regression model, market growth rate assumes a positive role in the model;
when the other variables (except licensee assets) are removed individually, growth rate is
a negative predictor of value. This relationship probably does not merit analysis, since
growth rate was not a statistically significant variable in any scenario. Removing both
market size and market growth rate reduces predictive power to 63.75% (from 64.24%).
Removing both market size and growth rate reduced R squared to 60.59% (from
64.24%).
The market size and projected growth rate of a drug's target indication are putatively
important factors in its value, however their importance may have been diminished in this
work due to:
* Low sample size: there were only 50 oncology deals with a named indication.
* Other unknown indications: although a molecule is undergoing initial testing for a
specific cancer, it may have applications in many other tumor types (especially in
the case of generalized cytotoxic drugs). A drug that initially tested for a smaller
market indication such as kidney cancer may have applications in treating other
larger market solid tumor types such as lung or breast.
* Failure to assess extent of competition: lung cancer treatment is a large market,
but there are many molecules currently in trials targeting that indication.
Licensees certainly evaluate the existing and emerging drug landscape and adjust
their valuations based on competitive products.
The rise of targeted cancer therapies: although a drug candidate may ostensibly
address a large market such as breast cancer, the patient population with an
identifiable addressable mutation may be much lower and known from the outset,
reducing a targeted therapy's valuation.
Additionally and possibly conversely, raw current market size may not be an accurate
indicator of market potential. Genzyme has built a franchise in serving rare, previously
untreatable diseases. Prior to the release of Serazyme, the projected market to treat
Gaucher's disease would have been Lilliputian, however, due to few treatment options,
companies can charge much more for therapies that impart a significant benefit.
Year of Deal
All deal value amounts were inflation adjusted to 2005 dollars, however, there was still a
substantial increase in average deal values over the past few years. In both regression
models, the impact of the year of the deal was statistically significant. In the overall
model, each year added an average of $10.28M in deal value (p=.00513). Among deals
with a defined indication, each year contributed $9.51M in additional value (p=.0343).
By itself, year of the deal explained 15.73% (p=4 .03 e-5) and 13.23% (p=.00942) of
variation respectively in the two models. Removing year reduced R squared to 52.88%
(from 56.75%) and 59.83% (from 64.24%) respectively.
Discarded Variables
Due to low or insignificant correlations, regression analysis was not performed using the
following variables:
* Cytotoxic vs Targeted. The mean value of the 28 deals classified as "cytotoxic",
not associated with a specific biologic pathway, was $105.46M. The mean value
of the 73 "targeted" molecules was $101.08M
* Previous Year GDP. GDP in the previous year was actually negatively correlated
with deal value.
* Previous Year NASDAQ Value. The value of the NASDAQ index as of
December 31st of the previous year was also negatively correlated with deal value.
The following summary table shows the independent impacts of individual variables and
the effects of removing variables from the larger regression model.
Variable Independent Predictive Power Reduction in R-Squared if
Removed
>2 Previous Licensor Deals 10.80% 3.24%
Licensee Assets 43.7% 32.14%
Pharma vs. Biotech 9.21% .62%
Biologic vs. Small Molecule 1.00% .04%
Stage 6.09% 3.63%
Global vs. U.S. only 0% .77%
To summarize, assets of the licensee company was the most significant driver of deal
value. The following table shows impacts of individual variables and the effects of
removing variables from the regression model for molecules with a pre-defined oncology
indication.
Variable Independent Predictive Power Reduction in R-Squared if
Removed
>2 Previous Licensor Deals 10.80% 5.03%
Licensee Assets 37.60% 21.09%
Pharma vs. Biotech 3.15% 1.99%
Biologic vs. Small Molecule 2.29% 1.70%
Stage 0.09% 10.45%
Global vs. U.S. only 0% .50%
Market Size .92% 3.29%
Market Growth Rate 1.50% 1.09%
Licensee assets was again the most significant predictor of value, however, molecule
stage took on more importance in the group of deals with a defined indication.
Study Limitations & Recommended Future Research
Failure to consider molecules' qualitative characteristics
Unlike the 2002 work of Loeffler et al, "novelty" of the molecule was not assessed as an
independent variable in this work. Novelty was previously defined as the molecule's
uniqueness in its space: is it a first-in-class drug or "me too" product?
Perhaps more important than molecule novelty is molecule quality, which is significantly
more difficult to assess. Commercial success in the pharmaceutical marketplace is only
mildly affected by the independent variables considered in this work; more important are
qualitative factors such as molecule half-life, side effects and efficacy. A 2003
McKinsey and Company study found that, in addition to ligand efficacy relative to its
target, safety and convenience were the key drivers of commercial value (Christensen et
al). For future regression modeling, it may be possible to assemble a team to evaluate
qualitative attributes, but is probably not practical to undertake an extensive process for
each molecule since there is limited potential financial gain from developing a deal
regression model.
Inclusion of Future Deal Payments
This weakness has been oft referenced in this work and is the probably its single greatest
limitation. Ideally, one could select only deals for which there was complete information
with regard to the timing and magnitude of all milestones. These payments could be
probability adjusted based on accepted chances of passing clinical milestones and then
discounted back to present value. Due to the dearth of deals for which there is detailed
future payment history, one could not be restricted to a single indication such as cancer
and still include a statistically significant number of deals. Additionally, selecting only
deals with published milestone payments may bias results in an unknown way.
Inability to Assess Companies' Strategic Objectives and Competition
for the Deal
Business development managers' motivation to make a deal is certainly an important,
unaccounted for variable in this analysis. In addition to myriad potential strategic
considerations, the number of other companies interested in a molecule would probably
also impact deal value. These variables cannot be evaluated without interviewing the
business development managers who constructed the analyzed licensing deals. One
could attempt to interview many of the actors, however, this strategy would be difficult if
using a dataset that spans ten years.
Conclusions
A comprehensive regression model to describe the values of licensing deals for oncology
drugs or compounds for any other indication remains elusive. An ever-expanding array
of licensing payment types makes it difficult to even determine the value of a single deal,
much less quantify the impact of independent factors on collective licensing deal value.
This work was able to predict 56-64% of deal value variation and found significant
associations between value and the phase of the molecule, the size (measured by assets)
of the licensee partner and the experience of the licensor. The finding that licensors with
less experience receive value discounts for their drug candidates may be especially
controversial: business development directors at two licensing directors at large bio-
pharmaceutical denied that they pay newer companies less. An alternative explanation is
that, although applying a discount may not be a conscious decision by large companies,
new small licensors may under-price their incipient drugs; perhaps identifying this bias
may cause them to demand fair value in the future.
The principals of risk-adjusted NPV that are regularly employed in new drug valuation
could be used to improve licensing deal value regression modeling: by probability
adjusting future milestone payments and discounting them back to present value, one
could obtain a more accurate estimate of deal value. Unfortunately, information
regarding the timing and magnitude of future payments is usually not available until
those milestones are met.
Ultimately, attempts to quantify licensing deal values will fall somewhat short, since non-
quantitative factors greatly influence licensing decisions. Strategic goals, personalities
and varying negotiating skills will ensure that drug licensing remains, in some respect, a
qualitative art. Based on conversations with corporate licensing managers, the key to
obtaining optimal value for a new drug, whose fundamental characteristics are already
well defined, is finding the partner who needs it most at that time.
As licensing of drug candidates becomes, as is predicted, increasingly more competitive,
the need for valuation techniques could actually be less acute. An increase in the number
of bidders for individual compounds could cause license pricing to approximate an
auction, reducing uncertainty regarding the market value of drugs. Of course, companies
would still need to estimate a candidate's internal value to them to ensure that the market
price is worth paying.
Licensing, as compared to more traditional acquisition, is still in its infancy as a science.
As companies continue to seek to reduce risk or share rewards via licensing deals,
perhaps new financial tools will emerge in licensing as currently rule in M&A analysis.

References
American Cancer Society (www.cancer.org).
BCG Focus. The Gentle Art of Licensing: Rising to the Productivity Challenge in
Biopharma R&D. July 2004.
Bureau of Economic Analysis. www.bea.gov
Bernard, Stan. Back to the Pharma Future. BioPartnerships - A Pharmaceutical
Executive and Biopharm International Supplement. p. 6-7. October 2004.
Christensen, McGlaughlin and Wunker. The Road to Nowhere? Pharmaceutical
Executive. April 2006.
Demain, Pamela. Importance of Licensing to the Pharmaceutical Industry. LESI
meeting proceedings. March 31, 2004.
FDA. Innovation-Stagnation: Challenge and Opportunity on the Critical Path to New
Medical Products. March 2004.
Frost & Sullivan Global Cancer Markets Outlook, 2001.
Hall, Jim. A Decade (and /2) of Deals. BioPartnerships - A Pharmaceutical Executive
and Biopharm International Supplement. p. 18-24. . October 2004.
Lam, Michael D. Dangerous Liaisons. Pharmaceutical Executive. Vol. 24. Issue 5. p.72.
May 2004.
Licensing Executives Society International. Licensing History from LESI. 2004.
Goldscheider, Robert ed. The LESI Guide to Licensing Best Practices, John Wiley &
Sons Inc, New York. 2002.
Medius Associations. Royalty Rates: Current Issues and Trends. October 2001.
Mitchell, G. R. and W. F. Hamilton. Managing R&D as a Strategic Option. Research
Technology Management (May-July), 15-22. 1988.
Meyer, Harold A., CEO of the patent law firm Novelint. Speech transcript. 2001.
Myers, Robert A.. Licensing: A Basis for Strategic Alliances. les Nouvelles. September
2001
Myshko, Denise. The Secret to Alliance Success. Pharma VOICE. Vol. 4, No. 10, pp. 14-
24. October 2004.
Nicholson S., Danzon, P., and McCullough, S. Biotech-Phama Alliances as a Signal of
Asset and Firm Quality. Journal of Business. January 2002.
Parr, R. L. Fair Rates of Return. Patent World (July) : 36-41. 1988.
PhRMA. Pharmaceutical Industry Profile. 2004.
Pitkethly, R. A review of patent valuation methods with consideration of option-based
methods and the potential for further research. Judge Institute Working Paper. March
1997.
Webster, Philippon & Hotsaliuk. Valuation of Biotechnology - Stage of Development is
Most Important. Business Valuation Review. December 2002.
